Review Essay: The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History by Thomas E. Woods, Jr. by Hummel, Jeffrey
REVIEW ESSAY
The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. By Thomas
E. Woods, Jr. Washington: Regnery, 2004.
THOMAS E. WOODS, JR.’S, Politically Incorrect Guide to American History
not only became a New York Times bestseller but also raised an amaz-
ing amount of furor, to a certain extent among the left leaning, who
are the book’s bête noire and would be expected to take offense, but
especially in conservative and libertarian circles, among the book’s
presumed friends. Woods’s survey of U.S. history from the colonial
period through President Clinton has been condemned so far by
Reason magazine contributing editor Cathy Young (2005a, 2005b);
both in the Boston Globe and on the pages in Reason, by John B.
Kienker in the Claremont Review of Books (2005); by Max Boot in the
Weekly Standard (2005); and in assorted blogs, most notably by histo-
rians Ronald Radosh (2005) and David Greenberg (2005); and by law
professors Eric Muller (2004/2005) and Glenn Reynolds (2005).
Some of the critics have laced their denunciations with ad
hominem attacks on Woods. Going beyond his book’s content, they
have dredged up what they consider either guilty associations with
the League of the South or unconscionable past writings in The
Southern Partisan. The most egregious offender is Eric Muller.
Although Muller in no way qualifies as either a libertarian or conser-
vative, his venomous assaults, descending to the low of Klan baiting,
have been frequently referenced by other critics of the book.
For all of this, Woods and his editors must share partial respon-
sibility. The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History (or PIG as it
unabashedly fashions itself) is written and packaged in a breezy, sen-
sationalist, and deliberately provocative style, with all the popular
I received helpful suggestions on drafts of this review from David Beito,
Mark Brady, Williamson M. Evers, David Henderson, and John Majewski. Be
assured, however, that none of them can be blamed for anything I have writ-
ten here. 
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trappings of The Complete Idiot’s Guide series or those assorted books
. . . for Dummies. Throughout its pages are sidebars calling attention
to “A Book You’re Not Supposed to Read” with a cute drawing of a
pig reading a book, or to “A Quotation the Textbooks Leave Out,”
next to a cartoon podium with a sign hanging on the front labeled
“PIG.” There are boxes exposing “PC Today,” and each chapter starts
out in the right-hand margin with a starred list of supposedly aston-
ishing revelations under the headline “Guess What?”
On the front cover we confront Mort Künstler’s portrait of
Confederate General James Longstreet (“Old Pete”) next to the cap-
tion “You think you know American history. But did you know: . . .
“ followed by another starred list. The back cover informs the reader:
“Everything (well, almost everything) you know about American
history is wrong because most textbooks and popular history books
are written by left-wing academic historians who treat their biases as
fact. But fear not: Professor Thomas Woods refutes the popular
myths . . . . Professor Woods reveals facts that you won’t be—or
never were—taught in school. . . .” Blurbs announce that the book
“heroically rescues real history from the politically correct memory
hole” (Ron Paul) and that it “refutes the misinterpretations of
American history that have misinformed generations” (Paul Craig
Roberts).
Despite coming to 270 pages, the book has nice big type with lots
of white space, making it in reality a slim volume. As a result, its cov-
erage of U.S. history is far from comprehensive. Nothing at all is said
about the Louisiana Purchase, President Andrew Jackson’s destruc-
tion of the Second U.S. Bank, civil service reform, the Spanish-
American War, Japanese-American internment during World War II,
Nixon’s wage and price controls, and other staples of standard texts.
Even the topics included may be touched on spottily, often reducing
The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History to nearly an insub-
stantial series of bullet points. This obviously leaves scant room for
complexity or nuance, and when you couple that with Woods’s jour-
nalistic selectivity and self-assured dismissal of dissenting views, it
is no wonder that readers unsympathetic to any of his strong opin-
ions are put off.       
Although Woods likely could not control everything his pub-
lisher, Regnery, did to promote the book, I find it hard to sympathize
with the tone of surprised martyrdom he takes in online replies to
critics (Woods 2005a, 2005b). He is clever enough to have known
what was coming, given the way he pitched his text. Indeed, I sus-
pect that truth be told, he actually enjoys stirring up the controversy,
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as he and his critics happily hurl charges of conscious ideological
distortion back and forth at each other across the web.    
The book’s stylistic features provoke more than mere aesthetic
annoyance at what purports to be an honest work of history being
marketed like the latest potboiler from Danielle Steele and with all
the huckstering pizzazz of P.T. Barnum. PIG’s marketing and packag-
ing is, to be blunt, misleading. Libertarian (or conservative) objec-
tions to mainstream history, as it is currently written by academics
and taught in colleges, rarely hinge on outright errors, dishonest
research, or disputes about hard facts. Cases of a Michael Bellesiles,
who actually fabricate evidence in furtherance of political conclu-
sions, are fortunately few and far between. Because professional his-
torians tend to be concrete-bound, with almost undue reverence for
facts over theory, factual details are not usually what gives rise to
discordant interpretations. What differs is either the causal analysis
or the ethical evaluation attached to those facts. This of course is a
compelling implication of Ludwig von Mises’s woefully neglected
Theory and History (1957).
Such respect for simple accuracy applies as much to Thomas
Woods himself as to other professional historians. He is a competent
disciple of Clio who makes very few outright factual mistakes—cer-
tainly no more than inevitably yet inadvertently sneak into any his-
tory dealing with so broad a span of time. For instance, my copy
states on page 187 that Winston Churchill gave his famous 1946 “iron
curtain” speech in Michigan, although an Amazon.com reviewer
reports that the location has been corrected to Missouri by the third
printing. Thus, while The Politically Incorrect Guide to American
History insinuates that it will expose myths and reveal hidden truths,
the actual text delivers far less than the popular packaging promises.
The efforts of Woods’s harsher critics to impugn his motives and
accuse him of deliberate falsehoods turn out to have as little sub-
stance as Woods’s impugning of and accusations against left-wing
historians.
This is not to deny that Woods’s interpretations are widely at
variance with mainstream history. But that variance, for the most
part, arises from differing theories and values—not from different
facts. I therefore propose to focus exclusively on the book itself
(ignoring Woods’s past associations and other writings) and evaluate
its historical interpretations on the basis of libertarian theory and val-
ues (this after all being a libertarian journal). How congenial with lib-
ertarianism is The Politically Correct Guide to American History? It
turns out only about half the time.
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Woods’s book consists of eighteen chapters of varying length. Ten
cover twentieth-century America, giving more recent events heavier
weight. Even Woods’s more measured critics, Cathy Young and John
Kienker, concede that The Politically Correct Guide to American History
has its strong sections, although they probably would not agree with
me as to which those are. I found that the best chapters tend to focus
on economic history: particularly Chapter 8 on the rise of big busi-
ness, Chapter 10 on the 1920s, and Chapter 11 on the Great
Depression. I would also include among the book’s highlights
Chapter 13 on how the U.S. got involved in World War II. The most
dissatisfying chapters tend to come earlier: Chapter 1 on the colonial
period, Chapter 2 on the American Revolution, Chapter 3 on the
Constitution, and by far worst of all, Chapter 7 on Reconstruction.    
Chapter 1, “The Colonial Origins of American Liberty,” starts out
with a curious omission. Following David Hackett Fischer’s (1989)
well-known social history, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in
America, Woods lists four major groups of immigrants to the
American colonies. But whereas Fischer makes clear that he is con-
fining himself to English speaking immigrants, Woods leaves the
impression that these four groups comprised the bulk of the
colonists, who all “came from one part of Europe” and “spoke a com-
mon language” (p. 1). Being a descendant myself of the Dutch set-
tlers of New Netherland, I could take umbrage. Yet as some review-
ers have observed, Woods ignores a still larger group: involuntary
immigrants from Africa, and their descendents, nearly all slaves. By
1770 blacks constituted more than one-fifth the total population of
those British colonies that would become the United States, the high-
est proportion relative to population blacks would attain throughout
all U.S. history.
Woods becomes still more selective when he takes on the treat-
ment of American natives. In crediting the Puritans of New England
with primarily voluntary negotiations and purchases in their acqui-
sition of Indian land, he skips over the far less noble record of white
Virginians and Carolinians. Within New England itself, there were
complex variations. PIG, for instance, implies that Roger Williams of
Rhode Island was somehow representative, when one of the several
reasons the Massachusetts magistrates expelled Williams from their
colony was his advanced respect for the rights of Amerindians.
Nor should a libertarian take comfort from the fact that the
Puritan consensus was “that the king’s charter conferred political and
not property rights to the land” (p. 8). The New Englanders’ haughty
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and galling assumption of political sovereignty over native
Americans was one root cause of such conflicts as the Pequot War.
White treatment of the Indians in North America was generally char-
acterized by the practice of collective guilt, in which punishment for
crimes was extended to innocent members of the guilty party’s tribe
or sometimes to other tribes, as Murray Rothbard has emphasized in
his four-volume history, Conceived in Liberty (Rothbard 1975, pp.
227–28). That may not qualify as true racism in Woods’s eyes, but is
it any more justifiable? Although Woods is technically correct about
the failure of the New Englanders to fully exterminate the Pequots,
Alden Vaughan’s New England Frontier (1995), a pro-Puritan study
that Woods references, admits that the Puritans indeed tried to. In
the Mystic Fort massacre of 1637, they exhibited a brutality against
women and children that horrified even the colonists’ Indian allies.
In Chapter 2, “America’s Conservative Revolution,” Woods con-
tends that the “American Revolution was not a ‘revolution’ at all” (p.
11). This conservative interpretation, in which the American
colonists were merely resisting the innovative encroachments of the
British Empire, has a hallowed tradition in American historiography
and came close to dominating the profession during the early Cold
War. That so much recent scholarship demonstrates the Revolution’s
radicalism does not necessarily prove this conservative interpreta-
tion wrong. A lot depends on how one defines a true “revolution.”
The American variant witnessed all the following alterations in the
internal status quo: eventual abolition of slavery in the northern
states with even some inroads in the South; the separation of church
and State in the southern states; the rooting out everywhere of such
vestigial feudal privileges as primogeniture, entail, and quitrents;
and the adoption of new republican state constitutions containing
written bills of rights that severely hemmed in government power.
Woods may simply choose to consider these changes insufficiently
radical.
If his standard for a genuine revolution is nothing short of the
terror unleashed during the French episode, then the American expe-
rience cannot measure up. But even here, the distinction must not be
overdrawn. As the classic work of R.R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic
Revolutions (1959, vol. 1, pp. 187–89), first called to attention, between
60,000 and 80,000 Loyalists fled with British armies during the
American Revolution, out of a total colonial population of 2.5 mil-
lion. Compare that with 129,000 French émigrés during the French
Revolution, from a population of 25 million. America produced
refugees at five times the rate as France, and while most of the French
expatriates returned, very few of the American loyalists did likewise.
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Rothbard’s Conceived in Liberty celebrates the radicalism of the
American Revolution. Although Woods lists these volumes in his
bibliography and clearly admires some of Rothbard’s other works,
he is certainly under no obligation to agree with Rothbard on every
count. The American Revolution, like so many great events, was
brought off by a disparate coalition of competing viewpoints and
conflicting interests. At one end of the Revolutionary coalition were
the American nationalists—men such as Benjamin Franklin, George
Washington, Robert Morris, Alexander Hamilton, and James
Madison. Representing a powerful array of mercantile, creditor, and
landed interests, the nationalists went along with independence but
certainly hoped to keep the Revolution conservative. They sought a
strong and effective American central government, which would
reproduce many of the hierarchical and mercantilist features of the
eighteenth-century British Empire, only without the British. Why
Woods would want to identify with these Statist elements is difficult
to fathom, given his pronounced hostility to government in other
chapters, but this is essentially what he does by embracing the con-
servative take on American independence.
This conservative bias cripples his next chapter on “The
Constitution” as well. A libertarian rendition could have absolved
the Articles of Confederation of the exaggerated complaints of the
nationalists, arguing that the problem with the Articles is not they
created a central government that was too weak but one that was too
strong. The Constitution, rather than representing the culmination of
the American Revolution, embodied in fact a reactionary counter-
revolution, designed to reverse many of the previous victories of
Liberty over Power. But you will find nothing of the sort in The
Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Instead, Woods ends up
wallowing in the constitutional fetishism of conservatives, worship-
ping the document (correctly interpreted, to be sure) as the sacred
text of America’s political religion.
The chapter at least hints that the Constitution, without its per-
spicacious Anti-Federalist opponents, would have contained no Bill
of Rights. Woods pays special attention to the First, Second, Ninth,
and Tenth Amendments, offering historical interpretations that are
quite sound. He is, however, at great pains to remind his readers
that the First Amendment only restricted the national and not the
state and local governments, a fact that he first brought up back on
page 3, when discussing the Puritans. The Constitution chapter,
having reiterated this information, does hastily admit, almost as an
afterthought, that only through the Fourteenth Amendment (incor-
rectly interpreted in Woods’s opinion) did the First Amendment’s
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separation of Church and State get extended beyond the federal
level, after which the chapter promptly returns once again to the
Founders’ view of the religion clauses.
This obsessive repetition within such a slim volume that leaves
out so much other American history inevitably raises concerns about
Woods’s own views about government and religion. Why harp on a
detail that every competent historian, informed journalist, and edu-
cated citizen already knows? No doubt Woods encounters students
who have never learned how the Bill of Rights was initially circum-
scribed in scope. I myself get students who do not even know the dif-
ference between the Constitution and the Declaration of the
Independence. In fact, some of my foreign-born students are unclear
that the American Civil War came after the American Revolution. But
I chalk this up to simple ignorance rather than left-wing distortions.
The libertarian solution to conflicts over the religious content of edu-
cation is to abolish all government schools, but reading PIG leaves
one with a nagging suspicion that Woods’s agenda is to bring reli-
gious elements back into government-subsidized curricula.
Chapter 4, “American Government and the ‘Principles of ‘98’,” is
much better, because Woods at last more closely aligns his text with
the radical opponents of State power and makes a partial and brief
retreat from his Constitution idolatry. Presenting a capsule history of
Thomas Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolutions and John C. Calhoun’s
doctrine of nullification, he strives to show how these principles
could provide workable limitations on the power of the central gov-
ernment. While Woods does also argue that these principles are con-
stitutionally plausible, he stops short of insisting that they constitute
the only proper constitutional interpretation. In other words, the
chapter puts the focus where it belongs: on the structural desirability
rather than strict legality of states’ rights.
In the final analysis, there is no absolutely correct interpretation
of the Constitution. From the outset, it was a political document,
deliberately ambiguous in some clauses to ease its ratification, and
contested right from the Philadelphia starting gate in 1787. Since
then, competing theories about applying the Constitution have vied
for political supremacy. American politicians have invariably
embraced whatever constitutional theory fits their policy predilec-
tions. Over the two centuries and more the Constitution has been in
force, only a mere handful of intellectually consistent statesmen has
ever publicly concluded that government activities they favored for
other reasons were proscribed under the Constitution. And I include
among politicians all judges, because the courts have always been as
politicized as the other branches.
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It is vain for hostile critics, such as Max Boot or John Kienker, to
ridicule Woods’s extreme defense of states’ rights. Doing so evades
the historical reality of many Northerners as well as Southerners tak-
ing such doctrines seriously. That today these ideas are politically
moribund has no bearing on their ultimate attractiveness. The current
refusal to give states’ rights a fair hearing obviously stems from their
past and intimate association with the South’s defense of chattel
slavery and Jim Crow. Hence the importance of PIG’s Chapter 4,
where Woods chronicles instances of states interposing themselves
against clear threats to individual liberty: alien and sedition acts,
protective tariffs, and fugitive slave laws.
II 
Which brings us to the section of The Politically Incorrect Guide to
American History that has provoked the loudest howls of outrage, the
two chapters relating to the Civil War: Chapter 5, “The North-South
Division,” and Chapter 6, “The War Between the States.” Woods
clearly wants to tender a neo-Confederate interpretation, in which
slavery is shunted into the background as a motive for southern seces-
sion. In his preface, he characterizes as a cliché the statement: “the
Civil War was all about slavery” (p. xiii). Yet notice the ambiguity in
the little word “all.” Drop it out entirely, to read “the Civil War was
about slavery,” and you have a statement with which even Woods
would have to agree. In fact, later on, Woods disclaims any attempt to
show “that slavery was irrelevant or insignificant” (p. 48). Change the
word “all” to “only,” yielding “the Civil War was only about slavery,”
and you now have a claim that no serious historian would endorse.
Woods is too scrupulous to fall into the careless or blatant errors
of the more amateurish neo-Confederate books, such as Tom
DiLorenzo’s The Real Lincoln (2002); Charles Adams’s When in the
Course of Human Events (2000); or James and Walter Kennedy’s The
South Was Right (1994).1 The Politically Incorrect Guide to American
History puts forward no such easily refutable claims as that the
southern states had no concerns about slavery’s future or that they
really seceded over the tariff. The resulting account of the Civil War
ends up far more mainstream than at first appears. Much of the two
chapters’ material, unaltered, could grace any standard treatment. A
few of Woods’s critics have gotten themselves all exercised over his
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1The numerous factual errors in DiLorenzo’s book have been noted even by
such favorably inclined reviewers as Gamble (2003), and Majewski (2003).
For a hostile review of both DiLorenzo and Adams, see Feller (2004). 
assertion that “for at least the first eighteen months of the war, the
abolition of slavery was not” the Union’s war aim (p. 65). But no
Civil War scholar would dream of denying the unmitigated truth of
that assertion.
In only two significant respects does PIG try to sneak a neo-
Confederate slant into its otherwise tame Civil War chapters. First, in
Chapter 5, Woods writes “that the slavery debate masked the real
issue: the struggle over power and domination” (p. 48). Talk about a
distinction without a difference. It is akin to stating that the demands
of sugar lobbyists for protective quotas mask their real worry: polit-
ical influence. Yes, slaveholders constituted a special interest that
sought political power. Why? To protect slavery.
Second, Chapter 6 boldly declares that “the Southern states pos-
sessed the legal right to secede” (p. 62). Here Woods lapses back into
constitutional fetishism, of a particularly silly form. Why should any
libertarian care one whit whether secession was a legal right? The
vital, unaddressed question is whether the southern states had a
moral right to secede. With respect to evaluating the American
Revolution, do we ask whether it was legally justified or whether it
was morally justified? If the secession of the slave states was truly
immoral, than of what possible import was the legal right? On the
other hand, if they indeed had a moral right to leave the Union, so
what if doing so was illegal? Only a legal positivist would let the
legality determine the morality of the act.
Whether the moral right of secession is conditional or uncondi-
tional is a question about which libertarian political theorists dis-
agree. I have made the case for an unconditional right of secession in
my own book on the Civil War (Hummel 1996).2 But Woods dares not
go down that path. Because if the states have a moral right to secede
from the Union, regardless of motives or grievances, then counties
have an unconditional moral right to secede from states, and individ-
uals from counties. This not only sanctions the Confederacy’s 1861 fir-
ing on a federal fort in Charleston Bay but also John Brown’s 1859
raid on a government arsenal at Harpers Ferry, which was merely an
attempt to apply the right of secession to the plantation.
Consequently, The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History
enmeshes itself again in a futile debate over the Constitution’s one-
and-only proper interpretation, which, as emphasized above, is a
quest for a chimera. Woods grasps at the ratification ordinances of
Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island, all of which he alleges
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2A libertarian treatise on political theory that ends up endorsing an uncon-
ditional right of secession is Kukathas (2003).
reserved the right of secession. Back in the Constitution chapter, he
did add a caveat to this allegation: 
Some scholars have tried to argue that Virginia was simply setting
forth the right to start a revolution, which no one disputed, rather
than a right to withdraw from the Union. But this interpretation is
untenable. (p. 18)
It is a pity that PIG does not provide the exact wording of these
ratification ordinances among its “Quotations the Textbooks Leave
Out.” Here is Virginia’s: “the powers being granted under the
Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States,
may be resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to
their injury or oppression.” The sentence containing these words, by
the way, actually precedes as preamble the formal ratification. The
wording in the New York and Rhode Island ratifications is almost
identical (Elliot 1836, vol. 1, pp. 327–31, 334–37). I leave up to the
reader’s judgment whether such language invokes a legal right to
secede or a natural right of revolution. Can such wording be reason-
ably construed as a precedent for secession? Probably. But as decisive
proof? Assuredly not.
All considered, Woods’s two chapters on the Civil War sadly
reduce to a missed opportunity. Hoping to present a neo-
Confederate interpretation, he let his consideration for the facts get
in the way. But that hope still prevented Woods from fashioning a
libertarian interpretation. And so he is left with the worst of all
worlds: a mundanely mainstream account that manages only to
offend readers as neo-Confederate without actually being so and that
scores few noteworthy libertarian points.
In the subsequent chapter, in contrast, Woods utterly fails to rein
in his neo-Confederate sympathies. Chapter 7 on “Reconstruction”
becomes therefore the book’s weakest. I’ll pass lightly over its argu-
ment that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified illegally, still
another manifestation of Woods’s constitutional fetishism. Every
American historian is quite aware of the irregularities surrounding
this amendment’s adoption, but so what? One may as well similarly
argue that the Constitution itself is illegal, because its ratification
clause violated the requirement for unanimous state consent to any
amendment of the Articles of Confederation. The critical issue is
whether the Fourteenth Amendment brought a net increase or
decrease in the liberties Americans enjoy.
On this, like secession, libertarians find themselves divided, and
pure logic does not require that even advocates of an unconditional
right of secession also oppose the Fourteenth Amendment. By
applying the Bill of Rights to the states, the amendment helped to
halt and forestall some of the most egregious government assaults
on the former slaves. It subsequently resulted in many court rulings
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that protected liberty, particularly those involving substantive due
process or freedom of speech. On the other hand, the Fourteenth
Amendment more recently has resulted in court rulings that violated
liberty, particularly those imposing forced busing or local taxation.
The most prominent libertarian defender of the Fourteenth
Amendment is Roger Pilon (2000a, 2000b) of the Cato Institute; the
most articulate libertarian detractor is Gene Healy (1999, 2000), also
of the Cato Institute. Woods obviously includes himself among the
detractors.
What is reprehensible about the Reconstruction chapter is not its
denigration of the Fourteenth Amendment but its apologia for the
Black Codes adopted by the southern states immediately after the
Civil War. Contending that these codes have been misunderstood,
PIG favorably quotes an essay written by H.A. Scott Trask and Carey
Roberts (2001, p. 301). “Most [of the codes] granted, or recognized,
important legal rights for the freedmen,” the two authors state in the
passage quoted by Woods (p. 81), “such as the right to hold property,
to marry, to make contracts, to sue, and to testify in court.” Marxist
historian Eric Foner, in his history of Reconstruction: America’s
Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877, notorious for its “political correct-
ness,” hardly disregards these aspects. He writes that the Black
Codes “authorized blacks to acquire and own property, marry, make
contracts, sue and be sued, and testify in court cases involving per-
sons of their own color. But,” Foner adds, “their centerpiece was the
attempt to stabilize the black work force and limit its economic
options” (1988, p. 199).
The first two codes, of Mississippi and South Carolina, were the
most severe. Mississippi’s required all blacks to have written evi-
dence of employment or face arrest. They were forbidden to rent
land or own homes outside towns and cities. Other provisions apply-
ing only to African-Americans criminalized insulting “gestures” or
language, preaching the Gospel without a license, or keeping
firearms. South Carolina’s code barred blacks from practicing any
profession other than servant or agricultural laborer unless they paid
a steep tax. The former slaves were required by law to sign annual
contracts, labor “from sunrise to sunset, with a reasonable interval
for breakfast or dinner” if they worked on farms, and if they were
house servants, “at all hours of the day and night, and on all days of
the week, promptly answer all calls and obey and execute all lawful
orders and commands of the family in whose service they are
employed.”3 Nearly every one of the states’ codes subjected blacks
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detailed monograph on the subject, see (Wilson 1965).
who were idle or unemployed to imprisonment or forced labor for
up to one year, while “enticement” laws made it a crime, rather than
simply a tort, to offer higher wages to a worker already under con-
tract. In essence, the goal was to have government partly assume the
role of the former masters by, in Foner’s words, “inhibiting develop-
ment of a free market in land and labor” (Foner 1988, p. 210).   
The excuse given by Trask and Roberts, as quoted by Woods (p.
81), for these provisions, is as follows: 
Many [Black Codes] mandated penalties for vagrancy, but the
intention there was not to bind them [blacks] to the land in a state
of perpetual serfdom, as was charged by Northern Radicals, but to
end what had become an intolerable situation—the wandering
across the South of large numbers of freedmen who were without
food, money, jobs, or homes. Such a situation was leading to crime,
fear, and violence.
Sometimes the line is very fine between empathically under-
standing the motives of historical actors and morally exculpating
their actions. If Woods, through the quoted passage from Trask and
Roberts, has not crossed that line with respect to white Southerners,
he has skirted dangerously close. The former slaves did wander
across the South and flock to cities immediately after emancipation.
Many southern whites found utterly irrational and ungrateful, on
the part of a people they had considered less than fully human, this
desire to exercise a newly acquired freedom by doing something
never permitted before and to perhaps track down lost family mem-
bers who had been sold away. That any American writing in the
twenty-first century who claims to be an advocate of liberty could
likewise view such wandering as “intolerable” borders on disgrace-
ful. As for flocking to the cities, which have always been magnets of
economic opportunity, African-Americans showed themselves no
less enterprising than other poor groups. Finally we come to Trask
and Roberts’s alleged violence, but the real wonder, which leaves
most historians marveling, is that blacks visited so little upon their
former masters.
The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History goes on to com-
pare the Black Codes with the vagrancy and discriminatory legisla-
tion of the North. Even if northern laws were actually as bad, that
hardly excuses the southern states. The Black Codes did indeed bor-
row from antebellum restrictions on free blacks, North and South,
from northern vagrancy statutes, from the labor regulations of the
Freedmen’s Bureau, and from the apprenticeship system adopted in
the British West Indies after emancipation in 1833 and later aban-
doned. But seeming parallels between northern laws and southern
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Black Codes are superficial, ignoring the profound impact that the
antislavery crusade had in promoting throughout the North a free-
labor ideology. During America’s colonial period, many laborers had
been indentured servants, a status they often (though not always)
voluntarily entered into, yet involving mandatory service for a fixed
term. By the time of the Civil War, indentured servitude was a thing
of the past, legally as well as practically. Except for sailors who
jumped ship and military personnel who deserted, an employee’s
breach of a labor contract was no longer a criminal but only a civil
matter. Moreover, specific performance was no longer a remedy for
such breaches, so that the North had moved, as the research of
Robert J. Steinfeld has reminded us, to the modern conception of free
labor, in which workers can essentially quit at will (Steinfeld 1991
and 2001).  
The North did have vagrancy laws with penalties on the books
that were unduly harsh. But northern courts mainly employed these
laws to discipline prostitutes and petty thieves. The South’s Black
Codes applied vagrancy more broadly. Mississippi, for instance,
counted anyone who “misspend what they earn” or who failed to
pay a special poll tax levied on Negroes between the ages of 18 and
60; South Carolina explicitly counted persons who lead idle or disor-
derly lives, as well as gamblers, fortune tellers, unlicensed itinerant
peddlers, and unlicensed thespians, circus performers, or musicians.
Northern restrictions on free blacks, while inexcusable, were neither
universal nor unchanging. By the mid-1850s Massachusetts had dis-
pensed with every limitation on blacks voting or holding office, with
its ban on Negro jurors, and with its prohibition of interracial mar-
riage—legal disabilities that characterized all the Black Codes.
Woods is quite correct that Illinois kept on the books until 1865 “a
law imposing a fine of fifty dollars upon free blacks entering” the
state. This law provided that any “unable to pay had their labor sold
to whoever paid the fine for them and demanded the shortest period
of labor” (pp. 81–2). However, as revealed by historian Leon Litwack
(not someone who would ever overlook or pardon any transgres-
sions against African-Americans), the Illinois law was a dead letter
and almost never enforced (Litwack 1961, pp. 70–71).4
The harshest features of the Black Codes were never enforced
either, because of intervention by the War Department’s Freedmen’s
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of which was subsequently overturned. 
Bureau. An exception was southern apprenticeship laws. Although
apprenticeship still existed in the North, the free-labor ideology had
transformed it there from a category of unfree labor into a form of
guardianship confined to minors. The Black Codes, in contrast,
allowed southern courts to bind out the children of black parents
without their consent or sometimes without their knowledge, simply
because the court found the parents unable to support the children.
In one North Carolina county, 10 percent of black apprentices was
over 16 years old. As late as 1867, Freedmen’s Bureau agents were
still releasing Negro children from court-ordered involuntary
apprenticeship.
The chapter on Reconstruction closes with an analysis of the
Radical Republicans. Relying on Howard Beale, a progressive-
school historian who wrote back in the 1930s, Woods attributes the
Radicals’ northern political success in the congressional elections of
1866 to their economic stances, particularly their support of high
protective tariffs (Beale 1930). But he has misread his source, at least
with respect to that election. Beale reveals that the Republicans
were so deeply divided over the tariff that they had to soft-pedal
the issue that year. As for Beale’s overall thesis that the Radicals
represented neomercantilist northern interests, subsequent research
has found it wanting. The Radicals were far from united over
purely economic policies. Some, like Representative Thaddeus
Stevens of Pennsylvania, were protectionists and inflationists.
Others, like Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, the leading Radical
in the Senate, were advocates of free trade and hard money. When
the Liberal Republicans, with their penchant for laissez faire, broke
with their former party to oppose Ulysses Grant’s reelection in the
presidential race of 1872, their ranks included a host of former
Radicals.
The Reconstruction chapter is responsible for one note of unin-
tended irony on the book’s cover. The original cover reportedly
would have displayed a picture of George Washington. Washington
was supplanted by General Longstreet, one of Robert E. Lee’s lieu-
tenants, undoubtedly to further Woods’s neo-Confederate aspira-
tions. Neither Woods nor his editors probably realized that, after the
Civil War, Longstreet became a prominent Louisiana Republican and
notorious southern supporter of Radical Reconstruction. For that
reason, former Confederate General Jubal A. Early and a cabal of
Virginians instigated a literary campaign to shift blame for the
Confederate defeat at the battle of Gettysburg from Lee to
Longstreet.
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III
After PIG’s treatment of Reconstruction, it is a relief to turn to a chap-
ter that I can praise without reservations. Chapter 8 on “How Big
Business Made Americans Better Off” is an outstanding corrective to
the standard condemnation of James J. Hill, John D. Rockefeller, and
other Gilded Age businessmen. Woods relies heavily, although not
exclusively, on Burt Folsom’s wonderful book, The Myth of the Robber
Barons (2003). Historians untutored in economics may be uncomfort-
able with this chapter’s content, but there is little in it that is incon-
sistent with such mainstream texts in U.S. economic history as Gary
M. Walton and Hugh Rockoff’s History of the American Economy
(2005), except for Woods’s libertarian rejection of all antitrust, a posi-
tion that not every economist accepts.
Chapter 9, “World War I,” is also good, although not quite as
unconventional, since its revisionist condemnation of U.S. entry into
that particular war still commands mainstream respectability. Even
proponents of the League of Nations agree with Woods that
President Woodrow Wilson’s uncompromising fanaticism torpedoed
any chance of U.S. participation. The book follows with a very brief
but excellent chapter on “The Misunderstood Twenties,” indebted
also to Burt Folsom, in this case for setting the record straight on the
tax cuts of Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, which, contrary
to most textbooks, helped those in lower tax brackets as much as
those in higher.
Chapter 11 covers “The Great Depression and the New Deal.” It
is another of the book’s best. Its main thrust is the highly contentious
yet thoroughly defensible thesis that Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New
Deal prolonged the depression. Although Nobel laureate Milton
Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, in their 1963 Monetary
History of the United States, 1867–1960 (1963), legitimized among aca-
demic economists the finding that government failure rather than
market failure caused the Great Depression, only a dissident if dis-
tinguished minority of economists (including Murray Rothbard and
Robert Higgs) has held further that government intervention under
both Herbert Hoover and FDR prevented recovery, that is until
recently. With the appearance in the August 2004 issue of the top-
flight Journal of Political Economy of an article by Harold Cole and Lee
Ohanian (2004), upholding this conclusion, it is now a serious con-
tender within the economics profession, and Woods provides a valu-
able service by giving it a popular forum.
With Chapter 12, “Yes, Communist Sympathizers Really Existed,”
Woods again begins to drift from libertarianism to conservatism.
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Nothing he says about the infatuation of pre-World War II intellectu-
als with Russian Communism or about the pervasiveness of Soviet
espionage is at all objectionable. He even gives his defense of Senator
Joe McCarthy a libertarian spin. Denying that McCarthy had any-
thing “to do with investigations into Hollywood” of private individ-
uals, PIG credits the Wisconsin Senator as “concerned with
Communists or Communist sympathizers in government” (p. 157 and
p. 168). Ronald Radosh’s (2005) online review waxes indignant at
Woods’s use of a book that Radosh and Harvey Klehr (1996) co-
authored on The Amerasia Spy Case, as if Radosh was the first ever to
suffer what is in fact routine among historians, having your own
research employed by others to arrive at inferences you may not
share.5 A re-reading of the pages establishes that Woods is quite care-
ful to distinguish between Klehr and Radosh’s findings about the
Amerasia case per se and his own appreciation for McCarthy.
What one would have hoped to see in this chapter, however, is
some acknowledgment of how the unholy triumvirate of President
Roosevelt, F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover, and Congressman Martin
Dies of Texas, often in bitter competition but still with unintended
collaboration, erected in the late thirties an extensive U.S. security
apparatus directed at both the far right and the far left. This appara-
tus continued to operate under Harry Truman into the fifties, and its
primary victims were not government employees but private indi-
viduals. Unfortunately Woods’s attitude toward the Cold War suffers
from a fundamental ambivalence, reflected here and arising later in
the book. The libertarian in him wants to denounce the U.S. govern-
ment’s Cold War interventionism; the conservative in him wants to
applaud the government’s Cold War anti-Communism.
Woods does have the courage to stick by his anti-interventionist
guns in the next chapter on “The Approach of World War II.” For that
reason, I can forgive his unreflective fondness (common among liber-
tarians) for the U.S. neutrality laws of the 1930s. The first U.S. neu-
trality act was enacted in 1794 to further the Washington administra-
tion’s foreign policy. Like all such acts, its primary restrictions
applied to private citizens and their involvement in foreign conflicts.
Americans who in the 1930s had joined the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
to fight in the Spanish Civil War, for instance, later found themselves
prosecuted by the Roosevelt administration for neutrality infractions.
(After a public outcry, the charges were dropped.) Because this is
exactly the kind of voluntary activity that libertarians should favor
permitting, as an alternative to the government intervention they
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oppose, the correct position is blanket opposition to all neutrality
legislation. The neutrality statutes so innocently designed to keep the
United States out of the Second World War by binding the discre-
tionary power of the president in reality infringed upon the freedom
of American citizens to trade and travel.  
Cathy Young in her Boston Globe review takes Woods to task for
ignoring “the moral issues in World War II,” while in Reason she
asserts that “Woods is wrong” because “U.S. intervention in World
War II . . . may have been vital to defeating totalitarianism.” But she
herself does not tackle the really hard moral and political question:
Roosevelt’s telling the American people he was trying to keep the
country out of the war while doing everything in his power to draw
the U.S. in. Interventionist historians do not deny this incontrovert-
ible fact; they explicitly or implicitly approve of the president’s lying
to the public for its own good. Sometimes they convince themselves
that if FDR had been more forthright, he could have changed
Americans’ minds. Equally often they criticize the president for not
getting the U.S. into the war sooner. If Young buys this excuse for
FDR’s prevarication, she should come right out and say so, although
it would raise some troubling doubts about her commitment to lim-
ited and transparent government.
Chapter 14 of The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History,
“World War II: Consequences and Aftermath,” combines several
good points with one bad one. It reports on Operation Keelhaul, the
forcible repatriation of Russians who had surrendered themselves to
the Americans, one of the most neglected atrocities from the annals
of the U.S. government. It explodes the Marshall Plan myth, bringing
to a wider audience Tyler Cowen’s demonstration of the trivial to
nonexistent role played by American aid in the postwar economic
recovery of Europe. And it comes out flatly against Truman’s mili-
tary adventurism, whether it be aid to Greece and Turkey or unde-
clared war in Korea. But this last position is somewhat at odds with
Woods’s tired rehashing, reflecting again his Cold War ambivalence,
of Roosevelt’s purported sellout at the Yalta conference. As if any
U.S. policy, short of full-scale war against Stalin, could have changed
the postwar fate of Eastern Europe. Bear in mind that, whereas the
economic contribution of the United States to the European outcome
of World War II was enormous, with America accounting for nearly
half the Allied output of munitions over the entire war, the military
contribution was minor and last-minute. The major European com-
batants, measured by either troops committed or casualties,
remained Nazi Germany versus the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe
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was simply going to be dominated by one or the other at the con-
flict’s conclusion.
IV
Woods wraps up his book with four chapters dealing with the
post-Korean War period. Chapter 15 on “Civil Rights” is a collection
of genuine horror stories about forced busing and affirmative action.
But if PIG’s perspective on Reconstruction had not already under-
mined its credibility on these sensitive issues, then its blasé indiffer-
ence toward government-mandated segregation now does.
Although Woods quite rightly exposes the peculiar sociological basis
for the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, he further suggests that racial integration of government
schools would have proceeded almost as rapidly without the deci-
sion. I do concur that “it is probably a waste of time to argue that
affirmative action violates Title VII” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (p.
207). The problem is the act itself, coerced integration being no more
moral than coerced segregation. Too bad Woods did not apply the
same healthy reasoning to the U.S. Constitution and save himself the
sterile disputes over its “legal” interpretation.
Chapter 16, “JFK and LBJ” is mainly preoccupied with critiquing
Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society.” A dispassionate recounting of the
welfare State’s historical consequences would have been devastating
by itself, but Woods cannot now resist sacrificing whatever historical
detachment he displayed in previous chapters for some outright
polemics. For example, in a sarcastic comment on the way “the
American intellectual class” nowadays dismisses “any distinction
between a ‘deserving’ and a ‘non-deserving’ poor,” he interjects:
“Shame on you, in other words, if you see a difference between a
widow with five young children and an irresponsible, self-centered
couch potato who simply refuses to work” (pp. 225-26). Those who
already agree may be entertained, but only at the expense of the
chapter’s persuasiveness. Plus PIG’s Cold-War ambivalence induces
equivocation over the Vietnam War. “Instead of taking the war to the
North and thus attacking the insurgency at its source,” Woods
appears to lament, in a paraphrase of Walter McDougall’s analysis,
(McDougall 1997) “American officials sought to export the welfare
state to Vietnam” (p. 229). I was left wondering about Woods’s own
opinion; does he oppose U.S. involvement in Vietnam or just the
inept way it was conducted?
The next, short chapter defending “The Decade of Greed” and
especially Michael Milken is a worthy one, but it only temporarily
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elevates the tenor of this concluding section of The Politically Incorrect
Guide to American History. The final chapter, entitled simply
“Clinton,” becomes little more than a political tirade. In flailing
around, Woods tell us that “Clinton dispatched the military overseas
an amazing forty-four times during his eight years. The U.S. military
had been deployed outside of our borders only eight times in the
previous forty-five years” (p. 242). Let’s see; between 1948 and 1993
we have the Korean War, Vietnam War, and the (first) Gulf War.
President Eisenhower sent the Marines to Lebanon in 1958, and
President Reagan sent them there again in 1982. Johnson invaded the
Dominican Republic in 1965, Reagan invaded Grenada in 1983; and
President George H. W. Bush invaded Panama in 1989. The U.S. mil-
itary skirmished with Libyan forces both in 1981 and 1986, while the
first U.S. troops were sent to Somalia in 1992, shortly before Clinton
assumed office. I’m already over eight military interventions in this
45 years and could go on. Of course, just as Woods has an idiosyn-
cratic definition of the word “revolution,” he may also have an idio-
syncratic meaning for “dispatching the military overseas.”  
In sum, The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History is a dis-
appointment for libertarians. Although there are many fine libertar-
ian introductions to economics, there has never been a general sur-
vey of American history from a libertarian perspective. The extreme
left has long had Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States:
1492–Present (2003), already in its twentieth-anniversary edition.
More recently, the militarist right has gotten Larry Schweikart and
Michael Allen’s A Patriot’s History of the United States: From
Columbus’s Great Discovery to the War on Terror (2004). The hackneyed
works of Paul M. Johnson, such as A History of the American People
(1998), have enjoyed an appalling popularity among libertarians,
except those who actually know some history.
Woods, alas, falls far short of filling this yawning gap. His con-
servative reverence for the Constitution, for the Old South, and for
tradition in general too often triumphs over a libertarian respect for
individual rights. Many of his negative reviewers ultimately dislike
The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History for being too anti the
United States government. The real problem is that the book is not
antigovernment enough.  
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel
San Jose State University
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